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Contracts.  Summit Insurance Co. v. Stricklett, 199 A.3d 523 (R.I. 
2019).  Insurance companies owe a fiduciary duty to their insured 
to defend them against liability to third parties by “good faith and 
fair dealings” with timely and fair settlement offers to the injured 
within the policy limits.1  The Rhode Island Supreme Court has 
declared that this fiduciary duty extends to an injured third party 
when the insured has clearly assigned his or her rights to the third 
party.2 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In April 2002, Eric Stricklett (Stricklett) operated a car which 
struck and injured Scott Alves, an eleven-year-old boy, who had 
jumped off his bike and ran into the road.3  Scott4 underwent three 
surgeries to repair his fractured tibia and fibula.5  In December 
2002, the Alves family (Alveses) submitted Scott’s medical records 
to Summit Insurance Company (Summit); however, after 
conducting an investigation, Summit determined Stricklett had no 
fault for Scott’s injuries and informed the family that it would 
“make no offers on this case.”6  Nearly eight years later, in April 
2011, the Alveses hired a new attorney who reached out to Summit 
informing them that the family would proceed with the lawsuit 
against Stricklett.7  The Alveses’ attorney notified Summit by letter 
that he disagreed with the finding that Stricklett had no fault in 
the accident and asked Summit to provide information regarding 
1. Summit Ins. Co. v. Stricklett, 199 A.3d 523, 528 (R.I. 2019).
2. Id. at 529.
3. Id. at 524 n.6 (citing witness testimony).
4. Consistent with the Court’s opinion, Scott Alves will be referred to by
his first name.  Additionally, Scott Alves, John Alves, and Cathy Alves will be 
referred to collectively as the “Alveses.” 
5. Summit, 199 A.3d at 524.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 524.
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the policy limits in Stricklett’s contract.8  Summit requested the 
Alveses call to discuss the claim; in response, the Alveses requested 
a copy of the entire policy because they would “not be in a position 
to discuss settlement . . . until [they had] seen the entire policy.”9  
On May 9, 2011, the family provided Summit with Scott’s 
medical records and bills, which included $59,792.66 in hospital 
bills and $20,945 in orthopedic treatments, and indicated that they 
were still waiting to receive a copy of the insurance policy. 10  Later, 
the Alveses learned that “Summit could not locate a copy of the 
insurance policy.”11  Due to the unavailability of the policy, the 
Alveses demanded a $300,000 settlement, stating that Summit was 
liable for the policy limit of $25,000 and due to its failure to 
previously offer its policy limits Summit would "undoubtedly be 
held liable for all interest over and above the policy limit."12  
Further, the Alveses claimed that, “if Summit failed to settle and 
the cases proceeded to trial, it would be ‘liable for all damages over 
and above the policy limits in accordance with Asermely.’”13  
Summit responded by offering the Alveses the policy limit of 
$25,000 which they rejected and subsequently filed suit against 
Stricklett.14 
Summit filed a complaint seeking declaratory relief against 
Stricklett and the Alveses, asking the court to declare that Summit 
had “no duty to pay interest beyond its policy limits on any 
judgment in connection with the underlying action” and that it had 
“no duty to pay the Alves[es] anything beyond its policy limits on 
any judgment in connection with the underlying action.”15  The 
Alveses counterclaimed for declaratory relief against Summit, 
“alleging that Summit was liable for ‘pre-judgment interest accrued 
upon all damages’ from Scott’s injuries and ‘for all damages over 
and above any provable policy limit.’”16  Both parties filed cross-
8. Id. at 524–25.




13. Id.; Asermely v. Allstate Ins. Co., 728 A.2d 461 (R.I. 1999).
14. Summit, 199 A.3d at 525.
15. Id. (alteration in original).
16. Id. Stricklett only indirectly participated in the succeeding litigation.
Id. 
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motions for summary judgment, which were denied because the 
hearing justice determined that “there were genuine issues of 
material fact concerning what had transpired between the parties 
in 2003, following the Alveses' claim.”17  Meanwhile, the Alveses 
submitted a motion for the declaratory-judgment action to be given 
priority over the tort suit, and the Superior Court granted that 
motion.18 
One year later, the trial justice issued judgment in favor of 
Summit.19  In his decision, the trial justice interpreted Summit’s 
insurance policy and concluded that the policy’s interest provision 
“did not require that Summit pay interest in excess of the policy 
limit and that this contract provision did not violate Rhode Island 
law.”20  The trial justice then examined the rejected settlement 
offer statute21 and determined that “the statute did not apply in his 
case because the Alveses had never made an offer to Summit at or 
around the policy limits.”22  Finally, the trial justice concluded that 
Summit owed no duty to the Alveses because they “were neither 
Summit’s insureds nor assignees of the rights of Summit’s 
insureds.”23  Although the trial justice noted that an insurer only 
owes its insured a duty, on March 13, 2017, he entered a final 
decision with a contradictory ruling, which stated that “Summit 
does owe a duty to the Alves[es] to act in a reasonable manner and 
in good faith in settling the claim,” but found that Summit had 
fulfilled this duty and hence was “not required to pay all 
17. Id.
18. Id. at 525–26.
19. Id. at 526.
20. Id. at 526–27.
21. 27 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-7-2.2 provides that when a plaintiff makes a
written offer to the defendant’s insurer in an amount equal to or less than the 
coverage limits and the defendant’s insurer rejects the offer, the defendant’s 
insurer shall be liable for all interest due on the judgment entered by the court, 
even if the payment of the judgment and interest totals a sum in excess of the 
policy coverage.  Id. at 527 n.12. 
22. Id. at 527.  The trial judge declined to rule on the applicability of the
prejudgment interest statute because he believe it would be premature to 
decide this issue.  Id.  
23. Id.
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prejudgment interest that has accrued on the action.”24  On March 
17, 2017, the Alveses filed a timely appeal.25 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court (the Court) “review[s] a 
declaratory decree of the Superior Court with an eye to whether the 
court abused its discretion, misinterpreted the applicable law, 
overlooked material facts, or otherwise exceeded its authority.”26  
“However, questions of law are reviewed de novo.”27 
On appeal, “the Alveses aver[ed] that the duty of an insurer to 
affirmatively settle an insurance claim on behalf of its insured . . . 
applies with equal force to third-party claimants in the form of a 
duty of good faith and fair dealings.”28  Further, the Alveses 
asserted that Rhode Island Supreme Court precedent “instruct[s] 
that a duty of good faith and fair dealing runs from the insurer to 
the third-party claimant regardless of whether there has been an 
assignment of the insured's rights.”29  However, the Court noted 
that it “has never recognized such a duty and has never held that 
an insurer has extracontractual liability to a third-party claimant 
in addition to a contractual, fiduciary duty to its insured for failing 
to settle a claim in a timely manner where § 27-7-2.2 was not 
applicable.”30  Due to the lower court’s contradictory holding and 
the Alveses misconceptions of the precedent, the Court found it 
necessary to clarify its past decisions.31   
The Court began its discussion of “relevant opinions” with 
Asermely; a case where an arbitrator awarded a settlement offer 
within the policy limits to the third-party claimant, which the 
insurer denied.  Following the trial, the verdict returned was an 
24. Id. (quoting trial judgment) (alteration in original).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 528 (quoting State ex rel. Kilmartin v. R.I. Troopers Ass’n, 187
A.3d 1090, 1098 (R.I. 2018)).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. (citing Asermely v. Allstate Ins. Co., 728 A.2d 461 (R.I. 1999);
DeMarco v. Travelers Ins. Co., 26 A.3d 585 (R.I. 2011); Skaling v. Aetna Ins. 
Co.,  742 A.2d 282 (R.I. 1999) (Skaling I); and Skaling v. Aetna Ins. Co., 799 
A.2d 997 (R.I. 2002) (Skaling II)).
30. Id.
31. Id.
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amount well above the policy limit, which the insurer refused to pay 
in full.32  After receiving assignment of the insured’s claims against 
the insurer, Asermely filed suit against the insurer for disregarding 
its duty to the insured in bad faith.33  The Superior Court ruled in 
favor of the insurer, and on appeal, the Court reversed.34  The Court 
held that an insurance company has “a fiduciary obligation to act 
in the best interests of its insured in order to protect the insured 
from excess liability”;35 therefore, if a plaintiff makes a reasonable 
settlement offer within the policy limits which is denied by the 
insurer, then the insurer is liable for any verdict over the policy 
limit.36  Additionally, the fiduciary duty extends not only to the 
insured, but also to “a party to whom the insureds have assigned 
their rights.”37 
The Court then discussed its decisions in Skaling I and Skaling 
II which “involved a first-party claim brought by an insured directly 
against its insurer for the refusal to pay underinsured motorist 
(UIM) benefits pursuant to the insurance contract involved in those 
cases.”38  In Skaling I, the Court “held that [the insurer] was liable 
for all prejudgment interest pursuant to § 9-21-10, because [the 
insurer] had breached its duty to the plaintiff-insured ‘by refusing 
to cover the damages within the contractual limits.’”39  Following 
the Court's decision, the insurer “moved for summary judgment in 
the Superior Court on an outstanding claim alleging insurer bad 
faith, arguing ‘that [the plaintiff's] claim against the underinsured 
tortfeasor was a fairly debatable claim, thereby relieving [the 
insurer] of any liability for insurer bad faith.’”40  The hearing justice 
granted the insurer’s motion and the plaintiff once again filed an 
appeal with the Supreme Court.41  The Court vacated the decision 
below and explained “that the duty of good faith and fair dealing 




35. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
36. Id. at 529.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 530.
39. Id. at 529 (quoting Skaling I, 742 A.2d 282, 292 (R.I. 1999)).
40. Id. at 530 (quoting Skaling II, 799 A.2d 997, 1001 (R.I. 2002)).
41. Id.
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settlement negotiations and to make and consider offers of 
settlement consistent with an insurer’s fiduciary duty to protect its 
insured from excess liability.”42  Unlike Asermely, Skaling II 
reiterated that the insurer has an obligation to act in the best 
interests of its insured with no mention or extension to a third party 
claimant.43   
Finally, the Court discussed DeMarco, where the Court 
considered “whether the Asermely rule should be expanded to 
situations with multiple-third party claimants.”44  The Court 
explained that the insurer’s duty to relieve the insured of as much 
liability as possible must be dealt with in “good faith and fair 
dealing” when multiple claimants exist and that “an assignee can 
bring a claim against an insurer, even after the insured has been 
absolved through an execution of release.”45  Ultimately, the Court 
held that the Asermely rule is applicable in the multiple-claimant 
context.46  
Here, the Court found that Asermely did not apply to the 
Alveses’ case because they never presented an offer within the 
policy limits to Summit, which is the only time that an insurer must 
seriously consider a settlement offer.47  The Alveses claimed that 
they could file suit against Summit under Asermely, which allowed 
a third party assignee of the insured’s rights to sue for operating in 
bad faith during settlement negotiations.48  However, the Court 
found two reasons why the Alveses’ claim failed: no offer was made 
within the policy limits and no assignment of the insured’s rights 
was given to the Alveses.49  Unlike Asermely, where the settlement 
offer was within the policy limits, the Alveses only settlement offer 
was made eight years after the accident for $300,000, which was six 
times the policy limit; therefore, the Alveses never made a 
reasonable settlement offer to be seriously considered by Summit.50  
42. Id. (quoting Skalling II, 799 A.2d at 1005-06).
43. Id.
44. Id. (quoting DeMarco v. Travelers Ins. Co., 26 A.3d 585, 605 (R.I.
2011)). 
45. Id. at 530–31.
46. Id. at 531.
47. Id. at 532.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 525, 532.
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Additionally, the Alveses argued Summit owed them a duty 
based on specific language from DeMarco, which states that 
although Skaling II involved a first-party claimant and Asermely a 
third-party claimant, both cases implicated similar policy 
concerns.51  However, the full context of the sentence further 
indicates that the insurer is obligated to put forth efforts to reduce 
the burden on the insured.  Thus, although the precedent cases may 
change in context from third-party claims to first-party claims, it 
remains constant that the insurance company’s duty for “good faith 
and fair dealing” in the underlying settlement discussions is to the 
insured, or under Asermely, to a third party claimant to whom the 
insureds have assigned their rights.52  Accordingly, the Court found 
Summit owed no duty to the Alveses and determined that the trial 
justice’s conclusion that Summit owed a duty and fulfilled this duty 
by acting reasonably and in good faith was incorrect.53 
COMMENTARY 
The Court, in deciding Summit never had a duty to exercise 
“good faith and fair dealing” with the Alveses during settlement 
proceedings, distinguished the facts in the instant case from those 
in Asermely, the controlling law, and Skaling I, Skaling II,  and 
DeMarco, the clarifying cases.54  The Court decided that these 
distinctions and clarifications were necessary to prevent a floodgate 
of litigation brought by third-parties against insurers.55  To allow a 
third party to bring a breach of duty claim against an insurer 
absent an assignment would expand an insurance company’s 
potential liability and establish a new judicially-created cause of 
action.56  Courts generally wish to avoid the creation of judicially-
created causes of action because it is the state legislature’s job to 
make the law.57   
Here, the statute at issue is Rhode Island General Laws section 
27-7-2.2, which states “in any civil action in which the defendant is
51. Id. at 532.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 533.
54. Id. at 528.
55. Id. at 528, 533.
56. Id. at 533.
57. McCullough v. State, 490 A.2d 967, 969 (R.I. 1985).
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covered by liability insurance and in which the plaintiff makes a 
written offer to the defendant’s insurer to settle . . . and the offer is 
rejected by the defendant’s insurer, then the defendant’s insurer 
shall be liable for all interest due on the judgment.”58  In section 
27-7-2.2, the legislature makes many references to the “defendant”
and the “defendant’s insurer” thus demonstrating its intent that
the duty owed by the insurance company is to the company’s
insured.  Therefore, in Asermely, the Court had the authority under
the statute to extend the cause of action to a third party who was
assigned the rights of the insured because the defendant-insured’s
rights against the insurance company were transferred to a third
party.59
It was proper for the Court to deny the Alveses’ claim that they 
could sue Summit under Asermely.  Given that the purpose of the 
statute is to allow suit against an insurance company based on the 
insured’s rights, the Court could not judicially create a cause of 
action allowing a third party to sue an insurance company for 
breach of duty when no legal duty is owed to that party, as this 
would directly contravene legislative intent.60   
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that an insurer owes no 
duty to a third party claimant and further clarified that Asermely 
only allows a third party claimant to sue an insurer on grounds of 
a duty of good faith and fair dealing if there has been an assignment 
of the insured’s rights and a reasonable settlement offer within the 
policy limits was rejected by the insurer.  
Amanda LaRocca 
58. 27 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-7-2.2 (emphasis added).
59. Summit, 199 A.3d at 529.
60. Id. at 533.
